When a comprehensive developmental and political history of South Africa is written it will be hard not to notice the paradoxes and profoundly contradictory narratives about the Eastern Cape.
All indications and historical records reflect an enviable and distinguished political, educational and intellectual, cultural, sports and religious heritage. The province was, for almost 100 years, the forefront of the wars of resistance against colonial conquest and the dispossession of Africans.
It was also a pioneer in modern education and religion, to a point of being referred to as the Mecca of African education in the late 19th and greater part of the 20th century. The scholars and intellectual giants are legendary.
The Eastern Cape also produced a disproportionate number of iconic leaders in the struggle against apartheid. And the democratic era has seen two globally respected presidents from here.
And yet, for various complex reasons, since the dawn of freedom the fortunes of the Eastern Cape have nosedived and it has sunk lower and lower onto its proverbial social, political and economic knees.
It has made frontpage headlines for all kinds of wrong reasons and one struggles to salvage redeeming qualities despite the efforts by government, political leaders, the business sector and civil society.
To be sure, many new significant developments have taken place since 1994 but these have occurred alongside choking decay and decline. For years many have pondered about why this has happened and, more importantly, what can be done to correct the detour the province is on.
Surprisingly only a few articles, studies and books have focused on these vexing issues. This piece, an overview, is meant to trigger an honest but difficult conversation about the state of our home province.
While a short article cannot do justice to all the issues or detail the nuances, a careful examination of facts nevertheless indicates that the challenges cannot be entirely attributed to individual leaders or the ruling party or government.
Most developmental challenges are structural, systemic, historical and pervasive. Some are due to poor policy choices and weak implementation capacity post-1994.
Here are a few characteristics:
l The absence of a common provincial identity or sense of provincialism. Instead, the pre-eminence of localised sub-regional consciousness is a striking feature. Those from the Transkei, Ciskei/Border or Port Elizabeth regions tend to see and organise themselves along regional lines, often to the detriment of the broader provincial project. This attests to the lingering legacy of deeply institutionalised apartheid homeland identities which have been reinforced by an apparently skewed distribution of resources or reconfiguration of service delivery centres which has alienated those who feel marginalised.
l Well-intentioned efforts to transform Bantustan institutions led to a subconscious but virulent hatred and neglect of infrastructure inherited from the Transkei and Ciskei. Most of this infrastructure has been allowed to collapse and decay with no clear plan of replacing or enhancing it. Irrigation and agricultural schemes, development agencies, teaching institutions, even those with a rich heritage, were either closed or allowed to collapse. Yet the same cohort of leaders have shown love and care to maintain apartheid infrastructure in many parts of the country. Such is the Fanonian psychology of alienation and self-contradiction.
l An over-dependence on the motor industry and related services in the Buffalo City and Nelson Mandela Bay metros.
l Neglect of rural development and agriculture as well as a lack of a consistent, coherent strategy to develop the areas, beyond token and symbolic projects. This has seen the precipitous decline of these areas into pockets of poverty and baskets of social grants beneficiaries. The green fields that used to dominate the landscape of the homelands now lie fallow and “free range” livestock parade along roads unattended.
l Land and traditional authority has always been central in the lives of rural Eastern Cape Africans. Today traditional leadership is in serious decline for various reasons. First, the province was the worst affected by the Nhlapo Commission’s investigations and outcomes – these reignited perennial divisions between and among kingdoms, something that is now spreading into chiefdoms which are currently subjected to yet another commission to establish the legitimacy of claims to traditional authority. This has sown divisions that will take a long time to heal.
The quality and stature of some of the current crop of traditional rulers leaves much to be desired. This situation has been complicated by the never-ending saga of land claims that are holding any development hostage due to uncertainty.
A considerable number of traditional leaders and their councils have also been trading their communal land to the highest bidders, even cutting into grazing lands and fields. All of this has encouraged corruption to permeate almost every transaction or dealing in the province.
The mass exodus of rural elite to urban centres has also given impetus to an urban-centered development orientation.
l There has been an exodus from the province of professionals, workers and students. And some of those now in influential positions seem to have lost their passion for the province’s development.
l Meanwhile back home some have ascended to the higher echelons of power in government, business and civil society, but much of society is increasingly in survival mode in squatter camps or on the desperate and dangerous streets of our cities.
l The once-thriving retail sector of small business in rural areas and small towns has virtually collapsed and been supplanted by a wave of south Asian (mainly from Pakistani or Bangladeshi), Chinese or Horn of Africa (mainly Somali) traders. Without any coherent strategy or support for small business in the retail and informal sector, there is little chance of competing successfully against highly networked and seasoned immigrant businesspeople who are also driven by an intense sense of survival.
l There has been a misguided over-reliance on the notion that, having produced two presidents (Mandela and Thabo Mbeki) as well as captains in the private and public sector, the Eastern Cape would necessarily derive a flow of development projects.
What actually happened was that a sensitivity over a perceived or real Xhosa dominance led to a paralysing caution on the part of those leaders and people had to ukuza kukaNxele (wait for Godot).
l A highly politically conscious population with scarce resources has led to the evolution of a complex and ubiquitous system of political patronage in which the deployment of loyalists with little or no skills is promoted. Many factional battles which are obviously more pronounced in the ANC, are due to the desperate struggle for job opportunities (deployment) and access to and control of state resources.
l Factionalism and the personalisation of power has fundamentally corrupted the system. It has also caused the decline in ANC membership – once the country’s largest. In turn a divided province can never produce a strong, united group to lobby for mega investments on the national stage. The divisions that have led to the Eastern Cape being unable to articulate its own interests has also turned the province into fertile ground for lobby groups from other provinces or national structures.
l Once known as the Mecca of African education excellence with prestigious schools synonymous with success, the Eastern Cape education system now limps from crisis to crisis. Meanwhile, Fort Hare and Walter Sisulu universities are tormented shells of their legacy institutions.
l Developmental challenges have led to an export of our challenges to other parts of the country, mostly big cities. From the mineworkers of Marikana to the informal settlements and street dwellers, our impoverished footprint is felt far and wide.
l Sadly, the small ember of hope once evident over the process of developing a provincial development plan seems to be dying amid a deafening lack of reference to the implementation of this programme – as is the case with many policy documents.
It would be interesting to know what the provincial development plan says as it has not been formally unveiled, let alone implemented.
Being defensive about the calamitous situation we are in – the ritualistic response – will not provide solutions. There is a fierce urgency for an intervention before the situation deteriorates to an irreversible state.
To be sure turning things around will not be easy and there are no shortcuts. It will need more than armchair critics pointing fingers at government officials or the ANC as if it is the cause of every societal ill.
It will need all of us in the province and from the diaspora putting our heads together and our shoulders to the wheel. A cross-section multi-stakeholder forum of leaders and policy-makers is needed.
We need to creatively reimagine the Eastern Cape, using our rich heritage as a reference and inspiration while clinically dissecting current socioeconomic and political challenges with the aim of crafting a solid strategy and a compelling vision.
Dr Somadoda Fikeni is a political commentator and a policy analysis and policy development specialist
Face up to developmental dilemmas
All indications and historical records reflect an enviable and distinguished political, educational and intellectual, cultural, sports and religious heritage. The province was, for almost 100 years, the forefront of the wars of resistance against colonial conquest and the dispossession of Africans.
It was also a pioneer in modern education and religion, to a point of being referred to as the Mecca of African education in the late 19th and greater part of the 20th century. The scholars and intellectual giants are legendary.
The Eastern Cape also produced a disproportionate number of iconic leaders in the struggle against apartheid. And the democratic era has seen two globally respected presidents from here.
And yet, for various complex reasons, since the dawn of freedom the fortunes of the Eastern Cape have nosedived and it has sunk lower and lower onto its proverbial social, political and economic knees.
It has made frontpage headlines for all kinds of wrong reasons and one struggles to salvage redeeming qualities despite the efforts by government, political leaders, the business sector and civil society.
To be sure, many new significant developments have taken place since 1994 but these have occurred alongside choking decay and decline. For years many have pondered about why this has happened and, more importantly, what can be done to correct the detour the province is on.
Surprisingly only a few articles, studies and books have focused on these vexing issues. This piece, an overview, is meant to trigger an honest but difficult conversation about the state of our home province.
While a short article cannot do justice to all the issues or detail the nuances, a careful examination of facts nevertheless indicates that the challenges cannot be entirely attributed to individual leaders or the ruling party or government.
Most developmental challenges are structural, systemic, historical and pervasive. Some are due to poor policy choices and weak implementation capacity post-1994.
Here are a few characteristics:
l The absence of a common provincial identity or sense of provincialism. Instead, the pre-eminence of localised sub-regional consciousness is a striking feature. Those from the Transkei, Ciskei/Border or Port Elizabeth regions tend to see and organise themselves along regional lines, often to the detriment of the broader provincial project. This attests to the lingering legacy of deeply institutionalised apartheid homeland identities which have been reinforced by an apparently skewed distribution of resources or reconfiguration of service delivery centres which has alienated those who feel marginalised.
l Well-intentioned efforts to transform Bantustan institutions led to a subconscious but virulent hatred and neglect of infrastructure inherited from the Transkei and Ciskei. Most of this infrastructure has been allowed to collapse and decay with no clear plan of replacing or enhancing it. Irrigation and agricultural schemes, development agencies, teaching institutions, even those with a rich heritage, were either closed or allowed to collapse. Yet the same cohort of leaders have shown love and care to maintain apartheid infrastructure in many parts of the country. Such is the Fanonian psychology of alienation and self-contradiction.
l An over-dependence on the motor industry and related services in the Buffalo City and Nelson Mandela Bay metros.
l Neglect of rural development and agriculture as well as a lack of a consistent, coherent strategy to develop the areas, beyond token and symbolic projects. This has seen the precipitous decline of these areas into pockets of poverty and baskets of social grants beneficiaries. The green fields that used to dominate the landscape of the homelands now lie fallow and “free range” livestock parade along roads unattended.
l Land and traditional authority has always been central in the lives of rural Eastern Cape Africans. Today traditional leadership is in serious decline for various reasons. First, the province was the worst affected by the Nhlapo Commission’s investigations and outcomes – these reignited perennial divisions between and among kingdoms, something that is now spreading into chiefdoms which are currently subjected to yet another commission to establish the legitimacy of claims to traditional authority. This has sown divisions that will take a long time to heal.
The quality and stature of some of the current crop of traditional rulers leaves much to be desired. This situation has been complicated by the never-ending saga of land claims that are holding any development hostage due to uncertainty.
A considerable number of traditional leaders and their councils have also been trading their communal land to the highest bidders, even cutting into grazing lands and fields. All of this has encouraged corruption to permeate almost every transaction or dealing in the province.
The mass exodus of rural elite to urban centres has also given impetus to an urban-centered development orientation.
l There has been an exodus from the province of professionals, workers and students. And some of those now in influential positions seem to have lost their passion for the province’s development.
l Meanwhile back home some have ascended to the higher echelons of power in government, business and civil society, but much of society is increasingly in survival mode in squatter camps or on the desperate and dangerous streets of our cities.
l The once-thriving retail sector of small business in rural areas and small towns has virtually collapsed and been supplanted by a wave of south Asian (mainly from Pakistani or Bangladeshi), Chinese or Horn of Africa (mainly Somali) traders. Without any coherent strategy or support for small business in the retail and informal sector, there is little chance of competing successfully against highly networked and seasoned immigrant businesspeople who are also driven by an intense sense of survival.
l There has been a misguided over-reliance on the notion that, having produced two presidents (Mandela and Thabo Mbeki) as well as captains in the private and public sector, the Eastern Cape would necessarily derive a flow of development projects.
What actually happened was that a sensitivity over a perceived or real Xhosa dominance led to a paralysing caution on the part of those leaders and people had to ukuza kukaNxele (wait for Godot).
l A highly politically conscious population with scarce resources has led to the evolution of a complex and ubiquitous system of political patronage in which the deployment of loyalists with little or no skills is promoted. Many factional battles which are obviously more pronounced in the ANC, are due to the desperate struggle for job opportunities (deployment) and access to and control of state resources.
l Factionalism and the personalisation of power has fundamentally corrupted the system. It has also caused the decline in ANC membership – once the country’s largest. In turn a divided province can never produce a strong, united group to lobby for mega investments on the national stage. The divisions that have led to the Eastern Cape being unable to articulate its own interests has also turned the province into fertile ground for lobby groups from other provinces or national structures.
l Once known as the Mecca of African education excellence with prestigious schools synonymous with success, the Eastern Cape education system now limps from crisis to crisis. Meanwhile, Fort Hare and Walter Sisulu universities are tormented shells of their legacy institutions.
l Developmental challenges have led to an export of our challenges to other parts of the country, mostly big cities. From the mineworkers of Marikana to the informal settlements and street dwellers, our impoverished footprint is felt far and wide.
l Sadly, the small ember of hope once evident over the process of developing a provincial development plan seems to be dying amid a deafening lack of reference to the implementation of this programme – as is the case with many policy documents.
It would be interesting to know what the provincial development plan says as it has not been formally unveiled, let alone implemented.
Being defensive about the calamitous situation we are in – the ritualistic response – will not provide solutions. There is a fierce urgency for an intervention before the situation deteriorates to an irreversible state.
To be sure turning things around will not be easy and there are no shortcuts. It will need more than armchair critics pointing fingers at government officials or the ANC as if it is the cause of every societal ill.
It will need all of us in the province and from the diaspora putting our heads together and our shoulders to the wheel. A cross-section multi-stakeholder forum of leaders and policy-makers is needed.
We need to creatively reimagine the Eastern Cape, using our rich heritage as a reference and inspiration while clinically dissecting current socioeconomic and political challenges with the aim of crafting a solid strategy and a compelling vision.
Dr Somadoda Fikeni is a political commentator and a policy analysis and policy development specialist
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