OPINION: Contralesa, where to now?

Jongisilo Pokwana ka Menziwa is from the Pokwana traditional council, in kwaZangashe. He is director of the Vusizwe Foundation for Oral Historical Research.
Jongisilo Pokwana ka Menziwa is from the Pokwana traditional council, in kwaZangashe. He is director of the Vusizwe Foundation for Oral Historical Research.
IT IS increasingly clear that traditional leadership is approaching a dangerous crossroads. In many communities the relationship between traditional leaders and the people has been transformed. Life and the welfare of the people no longer revolve around the dictates of the Great Place.

Even the role of the traditional leader has evolved with government having taken away most powers, leaving traditional leaders as lame-duck supervisors of the countryside.

What has also developed among some in traditional leadership is a narrow self-interest. This has rendered many traditional leaders outside of the vanguard of society.

From inception, through the unbanning of political organisations and the beginning of constitutional negotiations between the ANC and the apartheid regime, Contralesa enjoyed good working relations with the ANC. The future role and place of the institution of traditional leadership under a democratic government was assured. The ANC’s constitutional guidelines of 1987 even stated: “The institution of traditional leadership shall be transformed to promote the democratic interests of the people.”

Twenty-nine years on, Contralesa continues to be a voice of our people, albeit a deteriorating one.

But it is a deteriorating voice because many unfortunate occurrences have taken place directly affecting the constituency of Contralesa. The organisation has also failed dismally to take centre stage and play a meaningful role. Three glaring examples of this have been at Marikana, during the xenophobia and now in the #FeesMustFall protests. Contralesa is nowhere to be seen.

It is against this background that we will examine the impending breakdown in relations between the ANC and Contralesa.

The point of departure is the expectation each party had of the other and what each got. For its part, the ANC would simply have wanted to consolidate the struggle against the regime and go into the first democratic elections having dismantled the homeland system and with a campaigning environment in which the messaging of the ANC resonated with traditional leaders.

Indeed this happened in most cases. Voter education in many rural areas was reduced to teaching people how to vote for the ANC.

Contralesa, on the other hand, had a lot to hope for – from the restoration of the powers and privileges of traditional leaders, to the restoration of the status of traditional leaders who had been demoted or deposed, to the levelling of the benefits of traditional leaders as well as the setting up of a house of chiefs within the administration of government to bring traditional leaders to the centre of administration in relation to their roles as custodians of culture and customs.

What ensued was cumbersome. In setting up the House of Traditional Leaders the government retained much control of the house. Indeed, many enjoy positions in the national and provincial offices, but the extensive attachment of the House of Traditional Leaders to government and seeming over-reliance of office bearers on the department of traditional affairs presented new challenges.

The manner in which traditional leaders are elected to the Houses of Traditional Leaders both at national and at provincial offices is also a factor. Some almost turn these positions into full time careers.

To avert this defective selection or election process traditional leaders must resolve to be selfless and to challenge a system that allows for their own economic positions and benefits to be prioritised.

At Contralesa’s historic November 2010 NGC meeting in Kimberly important resolutions were made in the presence of ANC national leaders.

One of these followed the realisation that the organisation would be dead if efforts were not made to prioritise the establishment of full time posts and proper offices across all key structures. Suffice to say, poor corporate governance in Contralesa strangled this ideal prematurely.

At the same NGC, resolutions were also made so that: traditional leaders would be at the forefront of promoting Heritage Month; that traditional councils would identify heritage sites and sacred places for development and protection; that the traditional African calendar denoting the various seasons of the year would be revived to deal with climate change; that government would expedite the meaningful transformation and democratisation of traditional councils into representative service delivery centres for rural communities; and that traditional councils become one-stop centres for availing all government services to traditional communities. None of these resolutions have taken effect in any way.

Traditional councils are merely mentioned in government gazettes and it ends there. As things stand, there are still no legitimate persona in traditional councils, which means traditional councils neither own the land, nor do they have power to enter into agreements, even with investors.

Before a traditional council can embark on a local investment opportunity, a traditional leader needs to go and beg government officials to administer a Permission To Occupy (PTO). This is one of many examples making it crystal clear to traditional leaders that the ruling party gave them the short end of the stick.

Reports of the cutting of ties between the ANC and Contralesa make a fundamental mistake – there were never any formal ties. To the ANC, Contralesa has always been more of a concubine, one the ANC holds with little respect. So where to from here?

The probabilities are vast given the changing political landscape. Assuming the trajectory evident in the August 3 election result continues, it may well spell a future different to what Contralesa hopes for in its current irritation with the ruling party.

Imagine a weakening ruling party which eventually loses the majority in the next election or the one after that. The status of traditional leaders, their role as perceived by both major players in opposition politics, as well as the policies of the radical EFF on the land question, may all land Contralesa in a space where the feeling is “we were better off under the ANC government”.

Could Contralesa emerge as a force to be reckoned with as a political party? My personal view is that it would be a waste of time. Contralesa does not possess that kind of critical skills-set. With over 8000 traditional leaders paid by government on a full-time basis, the organisation has deteriorated to the brink of extinction.

The organisation’s current messaging also fails to resonate with young people.

This will not help the ruling party if it wishes to still work with traditional leaders to capture the hearts of the majority of African people, 20 million of whom have their homes in traditional communities.

The extent to which corruption and the disregard for the rule of law has settled within the ruling party, its failure to provide reliable basic services to rural people, the desperation for jobs, and the current chaos resulting from the #FeesMustFall campaign, all complicate future relations between the ANC and Contralesa.

The only hope for Contralesa is that government implements a lot of the resolutions taken at the 2010 NGC and that Contralesa for its part cleans up house and ensures clean audits, strict corporate governance, and corrupt leaders are punished.

Only this will turn its image around.

Jongisilo Pokwana ka Menziwa is from the Pokwana traditional council, in kwaZangashe. He is director of the Vusizwe Foundation for Oral Historical Research. He writes in his personal capacity

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