News reports about “bad blood” between the political head of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (Cogta), Fikile Xasa, and the head of department, Stanley Khanyile (“Court papers reveal leadership strife” DD, June 8), refers.
The deep rifts that can exist between political heads (MECs) and the administrative heads of departments in the Eastern Cape provincial administration may have not come to the fore until now, but the present case has landed up in court.
However, interventions by political heads of departments in administrative matters – which fall within the mandate of heads of departments (accounting officers, in terms of the Public Finance Management Act - PFMA, as amended) – have been the norm in this province (perhaps in all provinces and in national departments too) ever since the PFMA came into force.
During my eight years working in Bhisho (in various capacities) I witnessed several instances where an MEC, acting in his/her capacity as executive authority, virtually took over the running of a department and made the administrative head virtually redundant.
Some came down so low from their political pedestals as to even interfere in the short-listing of candidates who had applied for junior positions in the department.
Other MECs, without the knowledge of their departmental heads, approved transfers of staff to and from various locations in the province.
In one an instance an MEC proceeded to lead a finance team (which is headed by the department’s CFO) to meet with the Auditor-General to discuss the planning of an impending annual audit.
The administrative head of the department was not even aware of the meeting, let alone part of it.
And the MEC did not see anything wrong with this, even though his role, in terms of the PFMA, does not remotely imply that he should engage the AG on the department’s year-end audit.
Many MECs have consciously or unconsciously undermined the administrative heads of their departments by assuming many responsibilities which are the preserve of the head of department.
MEC Xasa’s action in Cogta, of shifting senior staff around, should not surprise anybody. It’s the way MECs in the province have been behaving in the past.
Perhaps one may be quick to blame and condemn MECs who interfere with the roles and responsibilities that have statutorily been assigned to accounting officers and heads of departments (Sections 38 – 42 of the PFMA). I, personally, will not.
The problem lies with the PFMA itself. The drafters of the legislation unintentionally created two centres of power in departments – the executive authority (political head) and the accounting officer (administrative head).
The truth is that departments – provincial and national – belong to their political heads – the MECs and national ministers. Departments are the vehicles by which political objectives, which have been translated into departmental performance objectives, are achieved.
When the term of the political head of a department ends, he/she accounts to the electorate on what was achieved by the department. Heads of departments do not face the electorate to account for anything.
Unfortunately the PFMA has, to a large extent, reduced the political heads to mere onlookers in their departments. The accounting officer is the real “action” man or woman who makes things happen and accounts for anything that goes on in the department.
In terms of the PFMA the only time executive authorities spring into action (after being in slumber most of the time) is when they have to:
l Receive reports from their department’s head regarding under-collection of revenue; shortfall in budgeted revenue or overspending of the department’s budget;
l Receive the monthly in-year monitoring report on revenue and expenditure to date against budget – (Section 63 (b)); and
l Table in the legislature annually, their department’s annual report and the findings of any disciplinary board which may have heard a case of financial misconduct against the accounting officer of their department – (Section 65 (a) and (b)).
So the question is, what should be occupying the time of MECs and national ministers for the rest of the year? Should they merely be sitting down and receiving reports from their departmental heads and tabling annual reports in the legislature once a year?
The point is, they intervene in the running of departments simply because they want to be seen to be relevant. It’s simply a question of the idle hand trying to find work for itself.
And the degree of their “interference” is what usually creates the tension.
The shifting of Khanyile to social development and the head of department of social development, Bea Hackula to Cogta, will not solve the problem.
Any critical observer will see that the structural configuration is why heads of departments in the provincial administration do not last more than one contract term.
The solution lies with amending the PFMA to expand the role of executive authority and make them more active and relevant in their department.
Perhaps some of the accounting officer’s present responsibilities, especially relating to budgeting and performance evaluation could be devolved to them. That’s a handful of activities.
The HODs could oversee other corporate functions, such as human resources, accounting and financial management, supply chain management and preparation of reports.
Or an amended PFMA must create only one centre of power with the position of accounting officer being abolished and the executive authority assuming full control of a department both as administrative and political head.
Until such a time the PFMA is amended to expand the role and responsibilities of executive authorities, there will always be tension and fall-outs between the two centres of power in government departments.
Peter K Boateng is a chartered management accountant/chartered secretary. He worked in various capacities in the provincial government for about eight years and currently is a senior lecturer in management accounting at Walter Sisulu University
Root cause of fall-out between MECs and Hods
The deep rifts that can exist between political heads (MECs) and the administrative heads of departments in the Eastern Cape provincial administration may have not come to the fore until now, but the present case has landed up in court.
However, interventions by political heads of departments in administrative matters – which fall within the mandate of heads of departments (accounting officers, in terms of the Public Finance Management Act - PFMA, as amended) – have been the norm in this province (perhaps in all provinces and in national departments too) ever since the PFMA came into force.
During my eight years working in Bhisho (in various capacities) I witnessed several instances where an MEC, acting in his/her capacity as executive authority, virtually took over the running of a department and made the administrative head virtually redundant.
Some came down so low from their political pedestals as to even interfere in the short-listing of candidates who had applied for junior positions in the department.
Other MECs, without the knowledge of their departmental heads, approved transfers of staff to and from various locations in the province.
In one an instance an MEC proceeded to lead a finance team (which is headed by the department’s CFO) to meet with the Auditor-General to discuss the planning of an impending annual audit.
The administrative head of the department was not even aware of the meeting, let alone part of it.
And the MEC did not see anything wrong with this, even though his role, in terms of the PFMA, does not remotely imply that he should engage the AG on the department’s year-end audit.
Many MECs have consciously or unconsciously undermined the administrative heads of their departments by assuming many responsibilities which are the preserve of the head of department.
MEC Xasa’s action in Cogta, of shifting senior staff around, should not surprise anybody. It’s the way MECs in the province have been behaving in the past.
Perhaps one may be quick to blame and condemn MECs who interfere with the roles and responsibilities that have statutorily been assigned to accounting officers and heads of departments (Sections 38 – 42 of the PFMA). I, personally, will not.
The problem lies with the PFMA itself. The drafters of the legislation unintentionally created two centres of power in departments – the executive authority (political head) and the accounting officer (administrative head).
The truth is that departments – provincial and national – belong to their political heads – the MECs and national ministers. Departments are the vehicles by which political objectives, which have been translated into departmental performance objectives, are achieved.
When the term of the political head of a department ends, he/she accounts to the electorate on what was achieved by the department. Heads of departments do not face the electorate to account for anything.
Unfortunately the PFMA has, to a large extent, reduced the political heads to mere onlookers in their departments. The accounting officer is the real “action” man or woman who makes things happen and accounts for anything that goes on in the department.
In terms of the PFMA the only time executive authorities spring into action (after being in slumber most of the time) is when they have to:
l Receive reports from their department’s head regarding under-collection of revenue; shortfall in budgeted revenue or overspending of the department’s budget;
l Receive the monthly in-year monitoring report on revenue and expenditure to date against budget – (Section 63 (b)); and
l Table in the legislature annually, their department’s annual report and the findings of any disciplinary board which may have heard a case of financial misconduct against the accounting officer of their department – (Section 65 (a) and (b)).
So the question is, what should be occupying the time of MECs and national ministers for the rest of the year? Should they merely be sitting down and receiving reports from their departmental heads and tabling annual reports in the legislature once a year?
The point is, they intervene in the running of departments simply because they want to be seen to be relevant. It’s simply a question of the idle hand trying to find work for itself.
And the degree of their “interference” is what usually creates the tension.
The shifting of Khanyile to social development and the head of department of social development, Bea Hackula to Cogta, will not solve the problem.
Any critical observer will see that the structural configuration is why heads of departments in the provincial administration do not last more than one contract term.
The solution lies with amending the PFMA to expand the role of executive authority and make them more active and relevant in their department.
Perhaps some of the accounting officer’s present responsibilities, especially relating to budgeting and performance evaluation could be devolved to them. That’s a handful of activities.
The HODs could oversee other corporate functions, such as human resources, accounting and financial management, supply chain management and preparation of reports.
Or an amended PFMA must create only one centre of power with the position of accounting officer being abolished and the executive authority assuming full control of a department both as administrative and political head.
Until such a time the PFMA is amended to expand the role and responsibilities of executive authorities, there will always be tension and fall-outs between the two centres of power in government departments.
Peter K Boateng is a chartered management accountant/chartered secretary. He worked in various capacities in the provincial government for about eight years and currently is a senior lecturer in management accounting at Walter Sisulu University
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